How to tell what’s true? What should we believe in? One growingly influential approach can be called Bayesian epistemology. It claims, in broad strokes, that rational beliefs and changing belief should conform to a mathematically precise probabilistic framework.
I admit I was rather skeptical of it, but after reading the first chapters of E.T. Jaynes’ book “Probability Theory: The Logic of Science” I’ve given it more respect and thought and now think that at least on some levels these Bayesians may be right. So I’ve decided to write this series of posts to examine it more closely. I will be focusing on examining its underlying assumptions and, therefore, its validity – but also on deriving its conclusions at a level of rigor and in a manner that appeals to me.
This post serves as an index to the series. I will update it as more posts are added. The intended series can be divided into several parts:
Cox Theorem: Proving the ‘rational’ beliefs must conform to probability theory.